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Abstract
We study the long-run effects of initial labor market conditions on wages for a large sample
of male individuals entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. We find a
robust negative effect of unfavorable entry conditions on starting wages. This initial effect
turns out to be quite persistent and even though wages do catch up later on, large effects
on lifetime earnings result. We also show that initial labor market conditions have smaller
and less persistent effects for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers. We further
show that some of the long-run adjustment takes place through changes in job-mobility
and employment patterns as well as in job tenure. Finally, we find that adjustments at the
aggregate level are key to explain wages’ adjustment process in the longer run.
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1 Introduction
Young individuals who have completed their training and plan to enter employment may find
themselves faced with very different economic conditions. Some young workers may be lucky,
entering into the labor force while the economy is doing well and unemployment is low, and
may easily find a good-paying job. Some others may not be so lucky, finding themselfs forced to
start their labor market career in a recession, faced with much less promising career prospects.
These unlucky individuals will probably receive much lower initial wage offers compared to
when they had entered in a boom and may never make up with their luckier counterparts, and
they presumably will suffer from persistent losses in lifetime earnings.
In this paper, we present empirical estimates of the long-run effects of business cycle fluctu-
ations, captured by cyclical fluctuations in local unemployment rates, on young worker’s wages
and give an empirical assessment of the associated loss in lifetime earnings from entering the
labor force during a recession. Indeed, previous research has shown that the early years in a
worker’s labor market career are of special importance (Gardecki and Neumark, 1998; Neu-
mark, 2002). For example, Murphy and Welch (1990) estimate that almost 80% of all wage
increases accrue within the first ten years of labor market experience. It has also been shown
that movements across jobs are considerably more likely at the beginning of a worker’s career
than later on (Topel and Ward, 1992). Further, Raaum and Roed (2006) show that individuals
who face particularly depressed local labor market conditions at the time they finish school are
at a higher risk of unemployment not only when young but also in later years.1 Overall, the
empirical evidence thus suggests that any disruption at this early stage of one’s labor market
career may translate into considerable long-run wage effects. Also, because individuals at the
transition from education to work are eventually hurt most by aggregate labor market shocks,
it is these young workers who are often the main focus of labor market policies which aim to
cushion labor market shocks (Ryan, 2001). However, although we focus on individuals newly
entering into the labor force we believe that such evidence is informative about the persistence
of labor market shocks as well as about the reasons for such persistence more generally.
Indeed, there is growing empirical evidence on the persistence of negative wage effects from
economic conditions at the time of labor market entry, which eventually will accumulate to
1Similar results for British and Japanese workers are reported in Burgess et al. (2003) and Kondo (2007),
respectively.
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large overall losses in lifetime earnings.2 Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) in detail explore the
effects of entering the labor market during a recession on earnings and job mobility, using data
on Canadian college graduates who enter the labor market between 1982 and 1999. They find
a substantial initial wage penalty of about 9%, which fades to zero after the first decade of a
worker’s career only. They also find that the adjustment process works through an increase in
job mobility which in turn is driven by workers moving to better paying firms. Moreover, they
find that higher skilled graduates suffer less because they switch to better firms more quickly
while lower skilled entrants are permanently affected by bad entry conditions. Similarly, Kahn
(2009) focuses on male college graduates in the United States who were graduating sometime
between 1979 and 1988. She finds the group graduating in the worst economic situation to
suffer from a wage loss of up to 13% each year over the first twenty years of their labor market
career, relative to those graduating in the best initial conditions. Similar results are reported
in Oyer (2006). He shows that Ph.D. students in economics, graduating in times when the
demand for economists is high, are considerably more likely to get a position at one of the top
universities in the United States. Similarly, he finds that those MBA students who complete
their training in a recession suffer from negative effects on wages (Oyer, 2008). Again, the
long-term effects on income appear to be caused by the fact that workers entering the labor
market at different conditions are hired by different employers. Thus, particularly among
highly educated individuals for whom the transition in and out of attractive positions is very
low, it appears as if the entry job matters a great deal for the future career.3 Overall, all these
2Even though it has been known for a while that the distinction between cohort effects and cyclical and
life-cycle patterns is conceptually important (e.g. Freeman, 1981), it is only more recently that the empirical
literature began to focus directly on the relation between wage differentials across labor market cohorts and
initial labor market conditions. In contrast, the short-run association between the local unemployment rate and
wages or, more generally, between local labor market conditions and real wages has been extensively studied
since the pioneering work of Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), who find wages and local labor market conditions
to be negatively correlated. This negative association turns out to be a very robust empirical pattern and has
been shown to exist for a wide range of countries using very different sources of data and different empirical
specifications. This is documented in the survey by Nijkamp et al. (2005), for example, which reports an average
elasticity of real wages with respect to the local unemployment rate across countries of about -0.10. As these
studies focus on workers of different age and therefore at very different stages of their labor market career, one
might expect even larger effects when focusing on labor market entrants only, as starting wages are found to be
considerably more flexible than incumbent workers’ wages.
3One main concern as regards the validity of these results is that schooling and first entry into the labor force
may both be endogenous because individuals may choose to stay in school or get involved with further training
when faced with high unemployment and low starting wages. Indeed, several studies find that enrollment rates
are high when unemployment is high and opportunity costs of schooling are low (e.g. Card and Lemieux, 2000;
Dellas and Sakellaris, 2003; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1981). In line with these results, both Kahn (2009) and
Oreopoulos et al. (2006, 2008) find the duration of schooling to be endogenous. Both tackle the endogeneity
problem by instrumenting the business cycle indicator at the time of labor market entry with either the rate
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studies point to substantial losses in lifetime earnings from entering the labor market during a
recession as opposed to entering during a boom.4
However, all the above mentioned studies focus on the flexible labor markets of either
Canada or the United States and on highly skilled workers only. One may thus wonder whether
the results carry over to other, less flexible, labor markets and to less skilled workers. Empirical
evidence for other countries is scarce, but broadly similar results are reported in Kwon and
Meyersson Milgrom (2007) for the Swedish labor market. They find that workers entering the
labor market in a period of recovery are paid lower starting wages, but that they also get
promoted more quickly and therefore (but somewhat counter-intuitively) end up with wages
higher than average in the end. Also, negative effects of initial labor market conditions are
not to be confined to highly skilled workers. The paper Genda et al. (2009) is especially
interesting in this respect because it studies the effects of initial conditions separately for more
and less educated men in a comparison between Japan and the United States. The authors
find negative effects of initial conditions for higher skilled workers in both countries, but they
only find effects for Japan as regards lower skilled workers. They argue that both the hiring
system and employment protection drives the persistence of the effects for Japanese, while the
market for less skilled workers in the United States may indeed be quite close to a competitive
market. Kondo (2008) again uses data from the U.S. and finds that the initial effect of entering
the labor market during a recession is less persistent for both less skilled workers and workers
with weak labor market attachment, a finding in contrast to the result from Oreopoulos et al.
(2008) but in line with the results from Oyer (2006, 2008).
In this study, we use social security records from Austria to study the long-run impact on
wages of unfavorable entry conditions.5 Our sample consists of male workers who have entered
into the labor force for the first time sometime between 1978 and 2000, a period covering several
booms and busts. After individuals’ first entry into the labor force, we can follow their careers
for at least 5 and up to 27 years. Because the data contains comprehensive and very accurate
information about annual earnings and daily employment histories, it is almost perfectly suited
prevailing at a lower age or the rate in the predicted year of graduation.
4Besides these substantial effects on earnings, recent research presents the intriguing result that growing up
during a recession may even change individuals’ beliefs about the determinants of economics success (Giuliano
and Spilimbergo, 2009).
5Hofer and Weber (2002) and Raferzeder and Winter-Ebmer (2007) provide a more general empirical assess-
ment of wage mobility and Stiglbauer et al. (2003) of job turnover in the Austrian labor market.
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for this kind of research exercise. Unlike most other studies, we direct our attention not to
high-skilled workers but to workers with vocational training only. While this is partly driven
by data limitations, focusing on lower skilled workers also has some conceptual advantages. On
the one hand, we believe that this restriction reduces the problem of endogenous entry into the
labor force. On the other hand, it arguably also minimizes the role played by job promotions
which we do not observe in the data because the data contain no information about job levels.
Consistent with previous evidence, we find large and persistent effects of initial labor market
conditions on workers’ real wages. Specifically, we find that the elasticity of wages with respect
to the initial unemployment rate is -6.2% in the year of entry and then shrinks to about -1.5%
five years later, resulting in substantial overall losses in workers’ discounted lifetime earnings.
Several distinct mechanisms have been put forward to explain persistent wage differentials
across different labor market entry cohorts. It seem helpful to us to first distinguish between
external market forces and internal labor markets as in Lazear and Oyer (2004), and we believe
that both of them are likely to be important in explaining persistent cohort wage effects.
Specifically, we think that the empirical finding of wages of newly entering workers being more
responsive to fluctuations in the business cycle than incumbent workers’ wages as supportive
of such a conceptual distinction.6
The most obvious candidate explanations with respect to external markets are, in our view,
based on search frictions (Mortensen, 2003) or on a more general presumption that firms have
some discretion in setting their wages, either because firms have monopsony power (Manning,
2003) or because there is rent-sharing between firms and workers stemming from, for example,
product market imperfections (Guadalupe, 2007) or technical innovation (van Reenen, 1996).
More specifically, von Wachter and Bender (2008) find that workers with relatively high entry
wages have larger and more persistent earnings losses at job displacement, arguing that this may
be interpreted as evidence for temporary rent-sharing. While search models clearly emphasize
workers’ mobility across jobs as a potential adjustment mechanism to initial wage shocks, we
think that the accumulation of human capital can simply be viewed as the flip side of worker
6The effect of the local unemployment rate on starting wages of newly entering workers that we find is much
higher than existing estimates for Austria focusing on both new entrants and incumbent workers (see appendix
B). Qualitatively similar results are reported in Haefke et al. (2008) for the U.S. Related evidence on the wage
cyclicality of job movers vis-a`-vis job stayers is given in (e.g. Devereux and Hart, 2006). von Wachter and
Bender (2008) find that differences in entry wages within firms fade over time, which points to the importance
of aggregate forces, at least in the longer run. This result in turn is in line with the evidence presented in Lazear
and Shaw (2008), underlining the importance of external market forces.
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mobility and must therefore also be considered as part of a potential explanation. Indeed,
most of the studies already mentioned acknowledge the potential importance of mobility in
explaining differences in long-term wage patterns across labor market cohorts.7
However, the internal economics of the firm also appear to be important, at least for
incumbent workers, and may thus also be important to explain wage differentials between labor
market cohorts. Acknowledging some role of explanations based on the internal economics of
firms foregrounds the potential impact of formal salary systems and firms’ rules regarding
individuals’ job mobility and career paths within firms.8 In any event, it seems plausible to us
that employers differ with respect to their internal economics and that such differences may
be relevant in explaining how wages respond to shocks in external conditions, even though
recent research argues that most of the observed wage distribution appears to be driven by
worker heterogeneity.9 While there is a myriad of mechanisms that may potentially be useful in
explaining cohort effects in wages, only a few studies have tried to explicitly explain persistent
cohort effects in wages. In the contract model of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), workers starting
a job in times of high unemployment accept lower long-run wages initially, but then wages are
bargained over again as soon as economic conditions strengthen. Gibbons and Waldman (2006)
propose a model which combines job assignment, accumulation of task-specific human capital
while on the job, and employer learning about workers’ productivity can generate persistent
cohort effects in wages. Their main argument is that workers entering in a recession enter
low-level jobs with a higher probability and accumulate skills that are of less value, relative to
7Oreopoulos et al. (2008) find that mobility across firms and industries plays an important role in explaining
why cohorts’ wages converge in the longer run. They further find that the highly skilled workers quickly move
to better paying firms while the lowest skilled workers suffer from permanent earnings losses because they are
permanently down ranked to low paying firms. Similarly, Bowlus (1995) finds that job tenure is somewhat lower
for jobs started during a recession and Bachmann et al. (2009) find that workers entering in a recession have
a higher propensity to move across jobs. Relatedly, Kwon and Meyersson Milgrom (2007) find that those who
entered during a recession get more quickly promoted. In contrast, Kahn (2009) finds that those workers who
have entered in a recession have slightly higher job tenure, pointing rather to lower mobility (but accumulation
of more human capital), and Saks and Wozniak (2007) find that regional mobility is highest when unemployment
is low.
8Clearly, the most prominent (although not the first one) study based on personnel records is the one by
Baker et al. (1994a,b) on managerial workers from a U.S. service industry firm. Other interesting empirical
studies based on personnel records from single firms include Dohmen (2004), Flabbi and Ichino (2001), Seltzer
and Merrett (2000), and Treble et al. (2001). Recent international evidence on the pay structure both between
firms and across workers within firms is given in Lazear and Shaw (2008).
9For example, Abowd et al. (1999) show that a large fraction of the observed inter-firm wage dispersion can
be accounted for by unobserved worker heterogeneity and that firm fixed effects play a minor role only. See
Gruetter and Lalive (2009) for an analysis based on Austrian data with similar qualitative results.
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workers entering the labor market in a boom.10
An additional, final explanation rests on the argument that the composition of entry cohorts
changes over the business cycle. As has been argued by Bils (1985), and more recently by Solon
et al. (1994) and Blundell et al. (2003), endogenous (timing of) labor market entry over the
business cycle will result in compositional changes across different entry cohorts. For example,
it may be the case that only the better skilled workers find a job in times of high unemployment,
resulting in compositional effects because there will be relatively more skilled workers in entry
cohorts which start their career in a recession than in cohorts entering the labor market in a
boom (see also footnote 3).
We provide some empirical evidence on each of the three main mechanisms mentioned
above in this study. First we show that our results are not driven by sample selection over
the business cycle, but that they rather yield a lower bound of the true effects. Second, we
provide some suggestive evidence on the importance of the internal economics of the firm with
respect to the long-run adjustment of wages. This additional analysis is based on individuals’
initial occupation, i.e. blue- versus white-collar occupation, a characteristic that is easily and
very accurately observed in the data and which is arguably linked to the prevalence of features
internal labor markets such as formal salary systems or career paths and their importance in
determining wages. Specifically, we show that it is white-collar workers who suffer from large
and persistent negative effects while initial effects for blue-collar workers are much smaller and
quickly fade away in the years following labor market entry moreover. This finding is consistent
with Schwerdt et al. (2009), who find that, in the long run, earnings losses following job
displacement are much larger for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers in Austria.
One potential explanation for this finding is that monitoring is more difficult and/or more
costly for white-collar occupations and that therefore incentive schemes are more prevalent in
white-collar occupations. Third, and finally, we show that initial labor market conditions not
only affect starting wages but also have an impact on individuals’ mobility prospects in the
short run and thus on individuals’ accumulation of human capital. We further emphasize that
the business cycle itself is an important part of explaining the adjustment process of wages
in the longer-run, as both mobility and employment patterns seem to be mainly driven by
10In support of such an argument, Devereux (2000) finds that workers are assigned to tasks that need less
skills during a recession. On the specificity of human capital, see Neal (1995) and, more recently, Sullivan
(2009).
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changes in aggregate economic conditions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present our data
source and detail how we have selected our sample of male labor market entrants. Section
3 shows entry cohorts’ long-run wage profiles and discusses our econometric approach for
estimating the long-run wage effects of initial labor market conditions. Moreover, we discuss
the sensitivity of our results with respect to sample selection, functional form and usage of
different unemployment rates. In section 4 we study four specific explanations for the observed
sluggish wage adjustment in the long run. Specifically, we study the potential impact of
sample selection over the business cycle, the role of mobility and human capital accumulation,
the importance or the initial employment status and firm size as well as the role of the business
cycle. Section 5 sums up and concludes.
2 Data and Sample
2.1 Data Source and Key Variables
We use social security records drawn from the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD),
which is described in more detail in Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009). The ASSD covers the universe
of Austrian private sector workers from January 1972 until December 2005. Because the data
are collected with the purpose of administering and computing future old-age pension benefits
they contain complete and precise information about individuals’ annual earnings and daily
employment histories, presumably without any significant amount of measurement error.11
The data are perfectly suited for studying long-run wage profiles because they allow us to
construct individual wage profiles for a huge number of labor market entrants over a relatively
long period of time. The main drawback of the data is that some important labor market
characteristics are not available because they are of no relevance with respect to social security
entitlements. First, there is no information about working hours and we therefore can not
differentiate between full-time and part-time work. Second, earnings are top-coded because
there is a maximum level of regular old-age pension benefits and are therefore only recorded
up to the level which yields the maximum benefit. Finally, there is no comprehensive schooling
11See appendix A for additional details about specific features of the data and about the construction of the
key variables.
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measure available in the data. We will detail in the next section how we deal with these
problems.
The main dependent variable that we use throughout the empirical analysis is the real
daily wage in prices of 2007. That is, the real daily wage corresponds to the real wage per
day actually worked. The key regressor is the annual male unemployment rate, which is used
as our measure for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter into
the labor force. We have computed yearly male unemployment rates from the individual-level
employment histories contained in the raw data of the ASSD. This procedure has the advantage
that we can calculate unemployment rates back until 1972 (compared to published statistics
which reach back until 1978 only) and at any desired level of aggregation. We decided to
extract yearly male unemployment rates at the state- and the district-level, for both the age
group 15 to 65 and the age group 15 to 25. In general, we use the male unemployment rate
for all workers as main regressor, but we also provide some estimates using different rates.12
The ASSD also contains a few characteristics at the individual level, like individuals’ date of
birth, but most of the information relates to individuals’ employment spells. For instance, there
exists a broad indicator for occupation, distinguishing between blue- and white-collar jobs.
Other important characteristics relate to the employer, like the number of employees or industry
affiliation. Importantly, the data also contains the geographical location of the employer which
allows us to merge the corresponding unemployment rate to each wage-observation at the
individual×year level. On top, as the data allow us to track both individuals and firms over time
we can construct additional, time-varying measures like job tenure with the current employer
or different indicators of job mobility (across firms, across industries).
2.2 Sample Selection
For conceptual reasons, but also due to some important limitations of the data, we do not work
with the universe of all labor market entrants but with a specifically selected sample only. First,
we restrict our attention to male entrants only. On the one hand, female labor supply behavior
over the life cycle is much more difficult to model than male labor supply. On the other hand,
12It is not obvious whether the youth unemployment rate would be preferable to the overall unemployment
rate because the youth unemployment rate may suffer from endogeneity bias. However, as Austria’s youth
unemployment rate is very low compared to most other countries (e.g. Breen, 2005), the choice between the two
is presumably not very important in the end. Nonetheless, we show later on that the choice of which specific
unemployment rate to use does indeed not matter a great deal.
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we think that we can largely circumvent the problem of missing information about working
hours this way simply because most men work full-time. Further, we select workers who enter
the labor market sometime between 1978 and 2000, such that we can potentially observe at
least five additional years of earnings for each worker (remember that the data run until the
end of 2005). As a final restriction, we only focus on workers aged between 15 and 21 at
the time they first enter the labor force. Since we proxy schooling by individuals’ age at the
start of first regular employment, this restriction on age effectively serves as a restriction on
individuals’ schooling duration (see also appendix A).13 Therefore, this restriction essentially
excludes individuals with higher education (most importantly individuals with a university
degree) but it should include all or most individuals with an apprenticeship training or an
education of similar length and scope (like full-time vocational school).14 Our final sample
thus consists of all male lower-skilled labor market entrants from 1978 until 2000.
Table 1
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for some key variables, by individuals’ age at the time
they first enter into the labor force. Throughout, individuals who start their first regular
employment after they turn 30 years old are excluded in the first place as they presumably
never enter the labor force at all.15 The first column of table 1 shows descriptives for all
13We focus on a sample of labor market entrants such that each entry cohort is balanced with respect to the
potential range of schooling. That is, the potential range of schooling (i.e. age at entry) is the same for each
year of entry considered in the analysis. In order to determine the start of an individual’s first job within the
full range of ‘education’ in each year, we had to restrict the sample period to the years 1978-2000. In the year
1977, for example, we cannot exactly determine the first entry into the labor market for an individual aged 21
because this individual might already have entered the labor market with age 16, i.e. in the year 1971. In this
case, his entry is not observed in the data simply because the data do not start before 1972.
14The restriction on schooling is motivated by the following arguments. First, and most importantly, the
timing of the first labor market entry (and thus the duration of schooling) may be endogenous. We thus chose
to focus on less skilled individuals because we think that they are less likely to manipulate the duration of
schooling in order to counteract unfavorable entry conditions. On the other hand, less skilled workers may be
more likely to refrain from entering altogether or they may register for unemployment benefits instead of staying
in school. This channel is potentially important and we will discuss it in detail in section 4 and in appendix
C. Second, unobserved heterogeneity resulting from, for example, unobserved differences in inherent ability is
presumably a more urgent problem for higher-skilled workers. Working with a sample of workers with lower
education thus helps dealing with unobserved heterogeneity (we will present some tentative empirical evidence
in favor of this argument when discussing table 1 below). Relatedly, we believe that promotions - which are
not observable in our data - only play a minor role in our sample, at least when compared to highly skilled
workers for whom promotions are important as regards long-run wage profiles (Baker et al., 1994b; Gibbons
and Waldman, 1999). Moreover, because the ASSD contains no comprehensive schooling measure we have to
use age at first entry into the labor force as proxy for schooling and we think that this proxy probably works
well only for less-educated workers. Finally, including only less-skilled workers in the sample is a very effective
way of minimizing the practical problem that wages are right-censored.
15If we think about individuals who enter at a later age, this group of workers most likely consists of two
very different groups, but they are indistinguishable from each other in the data. On the one hand, there are
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individuals, the second (third) column shows descriptives for individuals aged 15 to 21 (aged
22 to 30) when first entering the labor market. The comparison of the second to the third
column shows that our sample restriction with respect to our schooling proxy (i.e. age at first
entry) works as expected. The sample of lower skilled workers, compared to the group of higher
skilled workers, contains a higher fraction of blue-collar workers, has considerably lower wages
on average and shorter duration of the first regular employment spell.
Note that, in the group of individuals aged between 22 and 30 when first entering the labor
force, highly skilled workers potentially are mixed up with low-skilled workers: individuals in
this group of workers either they spent much time in education or were unemployed before
(or had short employment spells not counting as regular employment). This is evident from
the proportion of workers below the lower censoring point or above the higher censoring point.
The probability of crossing any of the two points is higher for the sample of older workers.
Consequently, the variation in the real daily wage (and thus productivity) is considerably
smaller in the sample of younger workers than in the group of older workers, regardless of the
exact wage measure we look at. For example, the standard deviation of the log real daily wage
is much higher in the group of younger workers than in the group of older workers. As regards
the location of a worker’s first employment we see that there is more variation with respect to
both of those variables in our sample than in the overall sample or the sample of older workers.
On the other hand, however, younger workers seem to be more clustered with respect to the
industry of their first employment spell than older workers.
2.3 Sample Description
Because we follow all individuals from the year of their first regular employment onwards
until the end of the data in the year 2005, the resulting data set would have been huge. In the
following we thus work with a 30% random sample of all labor market entrants aged between 15
and 21. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for this sample of labor market entrants that we
actually use in the empirical analysis (note that the first column should therefore reproduce
the corresponding numbers from table 1, apart from sampling variation). Our final sample
truly high-skilled workers who enter the labor market at a later stage because they have stayed in school until
that time. On the other hand, however, there are also low-skilled workers who have not been employed or only
sporadically employed before starting their first regular employment. Because schooling is not directly observed,
we will necessarily mix these two groups of workers together.
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contains about 224,000 individuals and about 3.5 million wage observations (i.e. observations
at the level of individual×year).
Table 2
Table 2 shows that the average labor market entrant in our sample is about 19 years old
and holds his first job for almost three years. The average age at the start of one’s first job
fits the fact that mandatory schooling ends in the year when individuals turn age 16 and
that apprenticeships normally last for two to four additional years. The high fraction of blue-
collar occupations is consistent with our intention to only include individuals involved in some
kind of vocational training. Interestingly, a significant fraction of the sample (about a third)
experiences some unemployment before finding the first job. On average these individuals are
registered for unemployment benefits for somewhat more than one month . In consistence to
this observation we find age at first entry to be about half a year lower than age at the start
of the first regular job, reflecting the fact that the transition from education to work often
involves short periods of nonemployment. The average real starting wage amounts to about
47e per day worked. Note that there is no real censoring problem as only very few individuals
earn starting wages either around the lower or around the upper censoring point thanks to our
sample selection rules.
The next panel of table 2 shows the male unemployment rate at two different levels of
aggregation as well as the yearly aggregate number of labor market entrants. Both unemploy-
ment rates refer to the male working-age population (i.e. aged between 16 and 65) and have
been computed from the individual-level data of the ASSD. The average unemployment rate
in the year of labor market entry is about 6.5% and there are about 3,700 male individuals
entering the labor market in any given state and year.16
As regards employer-related characteristics, the lower panel of table 2 shows that our
sample predominantly consists of individuals working in either manufacturing, construction,
or in wholesale and retail trade. There are also significant shares of workers in gastronomy and
hotel business, transportation, finance as well as lobbies and social security agencies. Again,
this matches our purpose to only include lower skilled individuals. The high number of average
16In the analysis, we check whether our results still hold when using published unemployment data or using
the youth unemployment rate. It turns out that our results are very robust to the choice of unemployment rate
actually used in the analysis.
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employees per entry firm (about 600) hides the fact that most firms are small and thus that
most individuals are actually working in small firms. In fact, about 40% of all entrants start
their first regular employment in a firm with 25 or less employees. Also, the firms in our sample
predominantly engage males, presumably reflecting the gender distribution across industries.
We also see that workers rarely start their career in seasonal firms as it is evident from the
number of quarters a specific employer is observable in the data per year (i.e. this variable
counts the number of quarterly reference dates on which firm has at least one employee).
3 The Persistence of Initial Labor Market Shocks
Panel (a) of figure 1 shows long-run wage profiles for all labor market cohorts who have first
entered into the labor force sometime between 1978 and 2000. The black dots represent average
starting wages for each entry cohort and thus the dashed grey line shows how starting wages
evolve over time. Clearly, real starting wages have increased significantly over the period of
analysis, from about 37e in 1978 to about 50e in 2000. Also note that there is some cyclical
movement in starting wages over time which we expect to be related to economic conditions
prevailing in that year.17 The filled colored lines on the other hand represent long-run wage
profiles of cohorts entering the labor market in different years. Clearly, cohorts’ wages follow an
approximate concave path over time, implying that wage growth is highest in earlier working
years and then strongly flattens later on. Panel (a) for example shows that the 1978 entry
cohort starts with a real starting wage of about 41e per workday and experiences a raise in
real wage to about 97e until the year 2005. On average, this cohort’s real compensation has
therefore more than doubled in the first 27 years of labor market experience.
Figure 1
Panel (b) is a rescaled version of panel (a), making the differences in wage profiles across
entry cohorts more evident. It shows cohorts’ approximate wage growth (relative to their
starting wage) over the number of years of potential labor market experience. It thereby
makes the concavity of cohorts’ wage profiles even more obvious than panel (a). Looking at
the 1978 entry cohort again, panel (b) shows that this cohort’s average wage has grown by
17Indeed, appendix B shows that part of the cyclical pattern of starting wages relates to corresponding
variation in the unemployment rate and that starting wages are lower when unemployment is high.
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approximately 145% (= [exp(.9) − 1] · 100%) in the first 27 years of experience. Evidently,
most of this wage increase happens at the early stage of the labor market career (i.e. the wage
increase in the first ten years equals 86% (= [exp(.62) − 1] · 100%)). On top, long-run wage
profiles of different entry cohorts have quite some distinct overall shapes. More specifically,
the figure shows that returns to experience have in general decreased over time, meaning that
younger entry cohorts have considerably lower returns to labor market experience than older
cohorts. The 1995 cohort for example has only realized an average wage increase of about 58%
(= [exp(.46)− 1] · 100%) in the first ten years, which is much smaller than the corresponding
increase of the 1978 entry cohort.
In comparison, figure 2 shows the evolution of local unemployment rates which we use as
indicator for external labor market conditions at the time individuals first enter into the labor
force. More specifically, the dotted red lines in figure 2 show annual male unemployment rates
at the level of the state and the dashed blue lines show annual male unemployment rates at
the level of the district (both are computed from the raw data of the ASSD).
Figure 2
Figure 2 makes another point apparent that is important for the empirical analysis: the
years 1978-2000 cover several periods of both boom and downturn, and the identifying variation
in initial labor market conditions therefore stems not from a few neighboring labor market
cohorts only. A comparison across states makes it also clear that the states not only differ
in the level of unemployment but also with respect to cyclical variations around a longer run
trend: although all states have seen an increase over the whole observation period in general,
there are marked cyclical differences across states and districts. For example, Burgenland has
experienced a huge increase in the unemployment rate from about 3% in the 70s to about
7-8% in the first half of the eighties and then to about 9% in the second half of the eighties.
Vorarlberg, in contrast, experienced only a modest increase in the 80s, from a very low level of
about 1% to about 3%. However, there was sharp increase at around 1992, when unemployment
went up from about 3% to 7-8%.
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3.1 Econometric Model
In the econometric analysis, we will pay particular attention to modeling the concavity of
long-run wage profiles which is evident from figure 1. Second, we want cohorts’ wage profiles
to be a function of the initial unemployment rate. This means that we allow potential effects
to become weaker or stronger as labor market experience increases. Our basic econometric
model looks as follows:
ln(yit) = ln(ur0j[i])α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ln(ur
0
j[i]) · κ(expit)]α3 + xiβ + ψj + tiγj + it, (1)
where yit denotes the real daily wage of individual i in year t, expit is potential labor market
experience of i in year t, and ur0j[i] is the unemployment rate that was prevailing in region j
at the time individual i first entered into the labor market. Function κ(·) denotes that we
allow for a flexible functional form with respect to labor market experience.18 The effect of the
initial unemployment rate on current wages is allowed to change as labor market experience
increases by means of interaction terms between the experience polynomials and the initial
unemployment rate. We further include several control variables, subsumed by vector xi,
all of which are predetermined in the sense that they relate to an individual’s first regular
employment spell or to the time before having started to work. Specifically, we include our
proxy for schooling (i.e. age at first entry), the log of the absolute number of labor market
entrants in the year and state of first entry, an indicator for blue- and white-collar occupation
each, the number of employees and the fraction of the workforce that is female, as well as
location and industry of the first employer. Finally, we include a set of state dummies (ψj)
and state-specific quadratic time trends (tiγj). Of main interest are parameters α1 to α3 which
together describe the wage-experience profile as a function of the initial unemployment rate.
Specifically, α1 is the elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate in the
year of first entry (i.e. in the year where labor market experience is equal to 0), while α2 and
α3 tell us how the effect of initial conditions changes as labor market experience increases.
Some additional remarks about the econometric model which is given by equation (1) are in
18Specifically, we include the first three polynomial terms of potential labor market experience. We have
chosen the number of polynomial terms on the basis of a non-parametric, and therefore fully flexible wage-
experience model. The first three polynomial terms appear sufficient to reproduce the wage-experience profile
predicted from the corresponding non-parametric model.
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order. First, we intentionally do not control for any time-varying variables like tenure because
we view those characteristics as potentially influenced by initial economic conditions.19 There-
fore, parameters estimates of equation (1) correspond to the overall effect of initial conditions
and this overall effect may be the result of several different mechanisms at work. We will study
some specific adjustment mechanisms later in section 4. Second, because the regressor of key
interest (i.e. the initial unemployment rate) does not vary over time for any given individual we
can not use standard panel data methods like fixed-effects or first differences as these methods
wipe away not only all unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity but also all variation in the
key regressor. For this reason, we rely on estimation by simple pooled OLS. Third, the model
given by equation (1) is in general not identified non-parametrically because it includes cohort,
experience as well as year effects (Rodgers, 1982). Therefore, although not immediately evi-
dent, our model is identified only by imposing some assumptions with respect to the functional
form of the regression model.20 Finally, we have to take into account that our key regressor
is observed at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent variable, a fact that may lead
to grossly misleading inference (Moulton, 1986), and serial correlation in the error term is an
additional issue (Bertrand et al., 2004). We tackle both of these problems simultaneously by
applying the multiway-clustering method proposed by Cameron et al. (2006) which allows for
clustering at the level of year and state at the same time.21
3.2 Main Results
Our main results are shown in table 3 and graphically displayed in figure 3. The top panel of
table 3 shows point estimates of the key parameters, while the middle panel shows the elasticity
of real daily wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate at different specific values of
labor market experience. Because quite many parameters are involved, it’s somewhat easier
19The only exception is that we implicitly condition on current state of work because we include state dummies
as well as state-specific trends.
20Our model needs even more restrictions because we are interested in the effect of a time-invariant regressor,
which makes the problem of collinearity even worse. First, we estimate a parametric experience-wage profile
in most models, although the additional restrictions that we impose would allow us the estimate the profile in
a non-parametric way. There is a second parametric restriction with respect to age at first entry, our proxy
for schooling, as we don’t allow the returns to schooling to change across cohorts. Finally, we also impose
parametric restrictions on the time trend of wages.
21However, we believe that these standard errors provide a lower bound on statistical precision. As noted
by Wooldridge (2003), such an adjustment to standard errors may be overly conservative if there are many
individual-level observations but only a few clusters, as in our sample.
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to illustrate the substantive implications of the estimates graphically. Figure 3 therefore plots
the estimated elasticity of real wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate, along with
its 95% confidence interval, against potential years of labor market experience.
Table 3 and Figure 3
The model in the first column only includes the logarithm of the number of labor market
entrants, a set of state dummies and a common time trend as control variables. As expected,
there is an immediate negative effect in the year of entry. As shown by the point estimate in
the first row, the wage elasticity with respect to the initial unemployment rate equals -0.026 in
the year of entry, i.e. in the year when labor market experience is zero. However, this initial
negative effect fades away quite quickly as labor market experience increases. This is evident
from the middle panel of table 3 or, more clearly, from panel (a) of figure 3.
In the second column, we include state-specific quadratic time trends instead of imposing a
common trend across regions. This is based on the empirical observation that the states differ
quite strongly with respect to overall economic conditions (see figure 2 again). The resulting
initial negative effect appears to be quite a bit larger in this case, however without changing
the overall pattern by much. The estimated elasticity in the entry year is now -0.045, or about
70% larger than the corresponding estimate of the first model.
The estimates shown in the third column are also based on a model with state-specific
time trends, but which additionally includes control variables at the individual-leve. (most
of them relate to the first regular employment spell or even the time before). Adding these
individual-level controls makes the short-run effect of the initial unemployment rate larger
again. The point estimate of the initial elasticity is now -0.062 and now even reaches statistical
significance, the very conservative adjustment to standard errors notwithstanding.22 Further,
the pattern of estimated elasticities over labor market experience has markedly changed. In
particular, panel (c) of figure 3 shows that all estimated wage elasticities with respect to the
initial unemployment rate turn out to be negative, even twenty years after labor market entry.
Column (4) additionally allows for cohort-specific returns to experience by adding inter-
action terms between the polynomials of labor market experience and the entry year. This
22The impact on estimated standard errors of taking the grouping-level nature of the initial unemployment
rate into account is huge. For example, clustering standard errors on the individual level instead of clustering
on state and year yields a standard error of the coefficient on the log initial unemployment rate of about 0.003,
or about a ninth of the standard error shown in table 3.
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accounts for the steady downward shift in returns to experience as evident in panel (b) of figure
1.23 Allowing for varying returns to experience makes the short-run effect again larger (point
estimate of the initial elasticity is now -0.075) but the long-run effect somewhat less persistent
(see panel (d) of figure 3). The change in the shape of the wage elasticities at the higher values
of experience presumably reflects the imbalance of our sample as regards potential labor mar-
ket experience - older cohort are observed for longer periods than younger cohorts. It is thus
empirically difficult to allow for varying slopes of the wage-experience profile while estimating
cohort-specific long-run wage profiles at the same time. We therefore choose the model in
column three to be our baseline model. We will take this issue up again in section 3.3 however.
As to further illustrate the substantive economic implications of our estimates, panel (a)
of figure 4 shows predicted wage profiles for three hypothetical labor-market entry cohorts,
all endowed with average observable characteristics but entering the labor market at different
initial unemployment rates. More specifically, we predict the wage profile for a cohort entering
the labor market either at a very low, at the average, or at a very high value of the initial unem-
ployment rate. Predictions are based on parameter estimates shown in column three of table
3. We view the 90th percentile (which corresponds to an unemployment rate of about 10.4%)
of the observed distribution of the initial unemployment rate as a value representing a high
level of unemployment. Similarly, we view the 10th percentile (about 2.3%) as representative
for a low level of unemployment. The predicted wage profile of the cohort entering in a year
of average unemployment (equal to about 6.5%) shows the typical concave pattern of cohorts’
wage-experience profiles (compare with figure 1). The profiles of the two cohorts entering in
either times of very low or very high unemployment show quite different patterns. Clearly, the
difference in wage profiles is largest in the very first year of labor market experience. But even
though the difference gets smaller as labor market experience increases, it does not completely
vanish - even after twenty years of experience.
Figure 4
The bottom panel of figure 4 makes the differences across the hypothetical cohorts more
visible by showing their deviation from the cohort that faced average entry conditions. The
immediate wage loss resulting from entering the labor market in a recession as opposed to
23Note that we can only estimate the interaction terms, but not the main effect of the year of entry because
it is perfectly collinear with calendar year and age at first entry.
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entering in times of average conditions (in a boom) amounts to about 4% (10%). This initial
loss gets smaller as experience increases, and after about five years the loss from facing bad
entry conditions has gone down to a remaining annual wage penalty of about 1%.
Although initial differences in wages clearly fade away as labor market experience increases,
and even though differences in later years appear to be very small, our main estimates imply
large negative effects of entering in an economic downturn on lifetime earnings, as opposed
to entering in average or good times. This is illustrated in figure 5 which shows the present
discounted value of accumulated losses (gains) in lifetime earnings, using a real discount rate
of either 0% or 8%.24
Figure 5
Because there is still a difference in wages between the three hypothetical cohorts at higher
levels of labor market experience, the choice of discounting does actually make quite a difference
as regards the present value of the loss in lifetime earnings. Even if we use a constant real
discount rate of 8% per year, there still results a substantial loss in the present discounted value
of lifetime earnings on the order of about 15%, if one compares the long-run wages profile of
workers entering during bad versus average conditions.
Even if we compare less extreme values of initial labor market conditions, there still result
sizable effects on the present value of lifetime earnings. For example, we may compare a
cohort that is entering into the labor force when unemployment is about 20% higher than
for the cohort entering in times of average unemployment. Our estimates imply that those
workers from a cohort entering in times of higher unemployment would still incur a loss in
lifetime earnings of about 5% after twenty years of labor market experience25
24The main reason why we want to discount earnings losses at higher values of labor market experience relates
to the fact that we can estimate early wage differentials more precisely in the sense that the estimates of early
losses are estimated using a much broader range of entry (and thus birth) cohorts than the losses in later years.
25The average unemployment rate at entry is about 6.5%, and so the 90th percentile of the initial unem-
ployment rate (10.4%) is about 60% higher than the average. These are the numbers used for the calculations
shown in figure 5. Instead, using an unemployment rate which is only about 20% higher than the average (for
example by increasing the average initial unemployment rate from 6.5% to 7.8%) would thus still result in a
loss of lifetime earnings equal to about a third of the effect shown in figure 5.
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3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Table 4 shows some alternative estimates, all of them based on simple modifications of our
baseline model.26 A first robustness check relates to the concern that the estimated impact
may be driven by heterogeneous effects across (groups of) individuals. As a first check, we
therefore exclude individuals with lowest and highest starting wages. As the first two columns
of table 4 show, the key estimates hardly change across samples (in statistical terms). Even
though the initial impact is somewhat smaller in both cases, the long-run pattern of the effect
remains very much the same as in the baseline model based on the full sample (see column 3
of table 3). As a second check, we exclude workers who could not have been unambiguously
classified as workers starting their career as either a blue- or a white-collar worker (see column
3). Again, although slightly different point estimates result, both the immediate effect of initial
conditions and the overall pattern of wage elasticities is essentially the same as in the baseline
model.
Table 4
The remaining three columns of table 4 show estimates based on alternative unemployment
rates. We use the male unemployment rate taken from published statistics in the model shown
in column 4 (Bundeskammer fu¨r Arbeiter und Angestellte, 1980-2003). The model in column
5 uses the youth unemployment rate, which we have also computed from the raw data of
the ASSD and which relates to male workers aged between 15 and 25. Finally, we use the
unemployment rate at the district-level in the last model in table 4. In this case, the cross-
sectional dimension with respect to variation in the unemployment rate is markedly increased
as there are 35 districts, compared to only nine states in the case of the other unemployment
rates. On the one hand, this should bring down standard errors as the clustering is now done
on 35 instead of nine observations in the cross-sectional dimension. On the other hand, using
the unemployment rate at a more disaggregated level may run the risk of being endogenous as
workers may move to regions with lower unemployment (Wozniak, 2006). However, it turns out
26We use the log of the initial unemployment rate as our main regressor throughout the analysis. We made
this choice of model specification partly because it is the standard specification in the wage-curve literature (e.g.
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1990). On the other hand, our own analysis of the association between initial labor
market conditions and starting wages (see appendix B for details) has led us to think that this model is an
appropriate and parsimonious choice. Nonetheless, we have also re-estimated our main results using the level
of the initial unemployment rate as regressor. This yields similar results, even though the cyclical movement
appears to be more pronounced in this case (results not shown).
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that the choice among different unemployment rates does not play a critical role. Using either
the overall male unemployment rate taken from published data or the youth unemployment rate
computed from the ASSD yields estimates very similar to the baseline results, both in the short-
and the long-run. There is, however, a notable difference between using the unemployment
rate at different levels of regional aggregation: using the unemployment rate at the district
level results in a more persistent effect overall, as shown by the pattern of elasticities shown in
the last column of table 4. This may hint at the potential endogeneity of the unemployment
rate at lower aggregation levels, resulting from workers moving to regions with initially lower
levels of unemployment in order to increase the probability of finding a job.
Table 5
One issue that may be of more concern is the mechanical imbalance in our data, an im-
balance which results from the fact that older cohorts are observable for a longer period of
time than younger cohorts in our sample. As a result, our data are imbalanced with respect to
potential labor market experience by construction. We therefore re-estimate our main model
on different sub-samples which are all balanced with respect to potential labor market expe-
rience. For example, the first column of table 5 includes all entry cohorts, but it excludes all
observations with potential labor market experience larger than five years such that the maxi-
mum observed experience is the same for all cohorts. Thus, this sample contains the maximum
range of entry cohorts, but it does not really allow estimating long-run effects as only the first
five years of experience are considered. In the last column, on the other hand, we only include
the older entry cohorts for whom we can observe a large number of calender years. Overall,
table 5 shows that the pattern of wage elasticities with respect to the initial unemployment
rate is largely unaffected by correcting the sample for its imbalance in labor market experience,
albeit the point estimates differ somewhat. In all four cases, there is a negative and statisti-
cally significant effect in the year of entry which then fades away as labor market experience
increases. Our results therefore do not to hinge on the imbalance with respect to labor market
experience and they are not driven by a few specific entry cohorts only.
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4 Adjustment Mechanisms
As we have detailed in the introduction, different mechanisms may be able to explain the
persistence of initial labor market shocks and the sluggish adjustment of wages that we have
documented so far. In this section, we provide empirical evidence on three main mechanisms
in some detail.
First, endogenous (timing of) labor market entry over the business cycle may result in
compositional changes of entry cohorts. Thus, what appears to be an effect driven by initial
economic conditions might in fact only reflect differences in the composition of labor market
cohorts. However, we expect that sample selection - if present at all - will tend to make our
estimates smaller than they actually are because it seems reasonable to assume that only the
highly qualified job candidates get a position in times of high unemployment. Those who miss
out are likely to be the least educated. In such a situation, our estimates will likely correspond
to a lower bound of the true effect.
Second, as discussed in the introduction, features of internal labor markets (e.g. formal
salary systems, long-term wage contracts) may also play a role not only with respect to the
immediate effect of labor market conditions, but also with respect to the long-run adjustment
of wages. To this end, we study the mediating role of an individual’s initial occupational status
on the impact of initial conditions on wages.
Third, not only may it be more difficult to find a job in times of high unemployment,
workers who actually start their employment career in a recession may it also find more difficult
to switch to another job in the first few years until economy recovers. This implies that
workers starting their career in a recession are more likely to exhibit a lower mobility in the
early working years or even get stuck in their first job with a higher probability than workers
starting in a boom. As job mobility in early years of a labor market career is often associated
with real increases in wages, workers entering in a recession probably miss some important
opportunities. On the other hand, job retention, i.e. staying with the first employer instead
of switching between jobs, may also have a positive effect on wages through the accumulation
of firm-specific human capital. Further, sluggish adjustment at the macroeconomic level (as
evident from figure 2) may itself also be an important factor behind the long-run adjustment of
wages, as wages may arguably only adjust once macroeconomic conditions have improved. For
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example, it may be the case that the job-mobility prospects of workers entering in a recession
only become more fortunate once the economy as a whole has recovered.
4.1 Endogenous Labor Market Entry
The timing of labor force entry and thus the composition of labor market cohorts may be
endogenous for several distinct reasons. First, some potential labor market entrants, when
faced with an exceptionally high unemployment rate, may refrain from entering the labor
market altogether. We think that this effect is rather unlikely to be of significant importance
on our case because we focus on less educated men only. Second, both the choice of education
as well as the duration of schooling may be endogenous as both job prospects are weak and
opportunity costs of schooling low in times of high unemployment. Again, we think that in our
specific sample the choice of education is probably of less relevance, albeit some individuals
may try to receive some further training when facing bad job opportunities.27 The most likely
reason for endogenous labor market entry is that some workers will simply delay their entry
when faced with unfavorable entry conditions, either by registering for unemployment benefits
or by staying out of the labor force until they find a job. In any case, if those workers who
don’t get a job immediately are a selected group of all workers who intend to enter employment
in a given year, then the composition of the actual entrants changes along with corresponding
changes in the unemployment rate and thus potentially biases the estimated effect of the initial
unemployment rate on wages.28
One straightforward and easy way to take sample selection over the business cycle into
account is to consider the time from the first possible year of entry until the actual entry as part
of the outcome. We therefore re-estimate our baseline model, using the local unemployment
27A significant part of initial vocational training in Austria is provided by dual apprenticeship training schemes,
i.e. practical training provided by firms while attending part-time compulsory vocational school. Apprentice-
ships last from two to four years, depending on occupation. Full-time vocational and technical schools provide
an important alternative to apprenticeship training, and they also last up to four years. Details are given in the
report by the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture (2008).
28However, we can not say much about the first effect because we observe individuals only after they have
actually started to work. Individuals who refrain from entering the labor force altogether are not covered by
the data at all. However, we can study delayed entry into the labor force as a consequence of bad labor market
conditions (see appendix C). Indeed, the data suggest that there are considerable short-run effects of the initial
unemployment rate on labor force participation, whereas a significant part of the effect appears to run through
registering for unemployment benefits. Most importantly, as expected we find evidence for positive sample
selection in times of high unemployment (again, see appendix C). This finding is in line with previous studies
(e.g. Kahn, 2009; Oreopoulos et al., 2008).
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rate at age 16 (compulsory schooling ends in the year individuals turn age 16) instead of the
local unemployment rate in the year of actual labor market entry:
ln(yit) = ln(ur16j[i])α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ln(ur
16
j[i]) · κ(expit)]α3 + xiβ + ψj + tiγj + it, (2)
with ur16j[i] denoting the unemployment rate in region j in the year in which individual i turned
16 years old. Figure 6 illustrates the substantive results from estimating the model given
by equation 2: panel (a) shows the predicted wage profiles for the same three hypothetical
entry cohorts as discussed in section 3.2 before, panel (b) shows the predicted profiles minus
the profile of the cohort entering at average initial unemployment, and panel (c) shows the
estimated present discounted value of accumulated losses (gains) in earnings (the corresponding
parameter estimates are given in the column 2 of table 6).
Figure 6 and Table 6
A comparison of figure 6 with figure 4 (our baseline estimates) clearly shows that taking
sample selection into account not only results in a larger immediate effect but also makes it
more persistent. This result is consistent not only with our prior expectations, but also with
the empirical results summarized in appendix C. Specifically, the immediate effect when using
the unemployment rate at age 16 is -0.094, about 50% larger than the baseline estimate of -
0.062 (compare columns 1 and 2 of table 6). The increase in the estimated elasticities at higher
values of experience are even larger. For example, the elasticity at ten years of labor market
experience is -0.011 in the baseline model but is about twice as large when taking selection
into account (the resulting point estimate is -0.023). This results in quite a large difference
as regards the impact of initial labor market conditions on the present discounted value of
lifetime earnings. While the baseline model predicts a loss in lifetime earnings for entering
the labor force during a recession (in comparison to entry at average conditions) of about 15%
after twenty years of labor market experience, the point estimates that take sample selection
into account imply a loss of more than 30% after twenty years of experience.
4.2 Initial Occupational Status
The distinction between blue- and white-collar workers is informative because several con-
stituents of internal labor markets like initial job placement and job promotions, implicit wage
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contracts, but also formal salary systems are arguably more important for white-collar than
for blue-collar workers. From the perspective of internal labor markets, we expect initial job
placement, job promotions and formal salary systems to be more important for white-collar
than for blue-collar workers. Indeed, Schwerdt et al. (2009) show that Austrian white-collar
workers suffer from much more persistent wage losses resulting from job displacement than
blue-collar workers, although both groups suffer from quite substantial initial wage losses. We
therefore re-estimate our baseline model for blue- and white-collar workers separately.29 Re-
sulting parameter estimates are shown in columns 4 and 5 of table 6, separately for blue- and
white collar workers. Figure 9 again illustrates the quantitative implications graphically.
Figure 9
First note that, even though average starting wages are quite similar between blue- and
white-collar jobs, wage profiles are much steeper and thus wage growth is much higher for
white-collar workers (at least initially). This is presumably reflecting the fact that seniority
payments, probably as an incentive scheme as argued in Lazear (1979) or Lazear and Rosen
(1981) for example, or formal salary systems in general, are more important in white-collar
than in blue-collar occupations.
Interestingly, figure 9 shows that white-collar workers suffer from much larger immediate
losses than blue-collar workers. This result is in line with Schwerdt et al. (2009) who also find
the short-run effects of displacement to be much larger for white-collar than for blue-collar
workers. As a consequence, the losses are much more persistent in the longer run (although
the speed of wage adjustment is higher for white-collar workers). The resulting loss in lifetime
earnings therefore is estimated to be quite small for these workers and equals about 5% if
evaluated at twenty years of labor market experience. The corresponding figure for white-
collar workers is much higher and equals about 31%, about six times as large as the earnings
loss for blue-collar workers.
29Because blue- and white-collar workers in Austria are partially subject to different social security rules and
because they are covered by different social security agencies, we can easily determine workers’ occupational
status, without any significant measurement error. Again, note that some (few) workers could not have been
classified as neither blue- nor as white-collar workers. These workers are left out in the following analysis, and
therefore the sample sizes do not exactly add to the total sample size used in the baseline model.
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4.3 Job Mobility, Accumulation of Human Capital, and the Business Cycle
Entering the labor market when unemployment is high may not only make it more difficult
to find a job in the first place, it may also affect individuals’ mobility prospects and the
accumulation of human capital in the years immediately following labor market entry. We first
show that initial economic conditions influence variables describing mobility and human capital
accumulation before estimating their impact on long-run wage profiles. Because both cohorts’
mobility and employment patterns show strong non-monotonic behavior over the course of
experience, we estimate non-parametric versions of our baseline model:
ωit =
27∑
k=0
1(expit = k)α1k +
27∑
j=0
[1(expit · ln(ur0j[i])]α2k + xiβ + ψj + tiγj + it, (3)
where ωit denotes the outcome variable of interest for individual i observed in year t and
k = 0, . . . , 27 indexes the potential number of years of labor market experience. Specifically,
we analyze six different outcome variables. The first three outcomes are indicator functions for
mobility across jobs and across industries as well as an indicator for - either temporary or per-
manent - movement from employment to inactivity. The remaining outcome variables are the
annual number of days worked, the annual number or days spent in registered unemployment
and job-tenure with the current employer. As before, we allow the effects of initial conditions
to vary with experience by including interaction terms of the initial unemployment rate and
experience.
Figure 7
Figure 7 gives a succinct summary of the results by plotting the estimated elasticities of each
outcome with respect to the initial unemployment rate (i.e. αˆ2k) against potential labor market
experience (denoted by k). Panels (a) and (b) of figure 7 show the estimated elasticities of the
probability of changing jobs or changing industries with respect to the initial unemployment
rate. These two figures not only show that bad entry conditions reduce mobility in the year
of labor market entry, but also that they permanently change individuals’ long-run mobility
patterns. Panel (c) shows that there is no (or a small negative) effect on the probability of
(temporarily or permanently) leaving the labor force. Note that this effect is consistent with
positive sample selection in times of high unemployment. Not surprisingly, panel (d) shows a
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positive effect of initial labor market conditions on the annual number of unemployment days in
the first few years of potential labor market experience. However, there are no long-run effects
of initial conditions on average unemployment duration: the point estimates after about five
years of experience are essentially zero. More interestingly, panel (e) reveals a positive effect
of a high initial unemployment rate on the annual number of workdays. This does not hold in
the year of entry, but it holds in the following four to five years. This effect appears somewhat
surprising at first sight, but we think that it can easily be rationalized as being the mirror
image of the negative effect on mobility in the first few years of experience. Consequently,
we also find a positive effect of the initial unemployment rate on job tenure with the current
employer for almost the whole range of potential labor market experience, as is evident from
panel (f) of figure 7.
It thus appears that two closely related but countervailing effects are at work (indeed, the
two effects are two sides of the same coin). On the one hand, unfavorable entry conditions
reduce job mobility while, at the same time, they increase employment duration and therefore
job tenure with the current employer. While both job mobility and accumulation of human
capital through job retention have positive effects on wages per se, the overall effect appears to
be ambiguous. To determine the sign and the size of the overall effect of changes in mobility,
employment and tenure, we estimate a simple variant of our baseline model:
ln(yit) = ln(ur0j[i])α1 + κ(expit)α2 + [ln(ur
0
j[i]) · κ(expit)]α3 + tenitδ1 + [tenit · κ(expit)]δ2
+ emplitδ3 + ∆jobitδ4 + xiβ + ψj + tiγj + it, (4)
with tenit denoting job tenure with the current employer (in years), emplit denoting the annual
number of days worked, and ∆jobit being an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if an
individual has changed jobs between year t− 1 and t and 0 otherwise. We also allow the effect
of tenure to vary with labor market experience by including the corresponding interaction
terms because early job-tenure may have larger effects on wages than tenure accumulated later
on. Note that this model is essentially the same as the baseline model discussed before (see
column 3 of table 3), except that we additionally include some time-varying regressors which
we have so far considered as potential outcomes (and therefore not included as regressors).
Results are shown in figure 8 as well as in column 3 of table 6.
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Figure 8
Interestingly, it turns out that conditioning simultaneously on the future paths of mobility,
employment and tenure makes the negative impact of the initial unemployment rate slightly
more persistent than in the baseline model, without much impact on the immediate effect in
the year of first entry. Therefore, even though individuals’ mobility chances are decreased at
least in the first few years after entry, this appears to be (more than) offset by the counter-
vailing positive effect on employment days and on job tenure. In other words, if there were
no adjustments with respect to job mobility, employment and tenure across the different entry
cohorts, then the negative effect of entering in bad conditions would be slightly larger than
what we actually observe to happen. If we hold adjustments though changes in mobility and
employment constant, we estimate a present discounted value of earnings loss after twenty
years of experience of about 19%, compared to about 15% in our baseline model. Thus ad-
justments through changes in mobility and employment have a significant, albeit quite small,
dampening effect as regards the impact of initial conditions on wages in the longer run.
A final point that we want to make relates to the role played by aggregate labor market
conditions. Indeed, the persistence in aggregate labor market conditions, which is evident from
figure 2 for example, suggests that it may also be important to study the role of the business
cycle itself as part of how wages adjust to initial labor market shocks. Individuals who enter into
the labor force in times of high unemployment will presumably face more favorable economic
conditions some years after their entry, whereas on the other side the initially lucky are more
likely to be confronted with unpleasant conditions sometime later in their labor market career.
As to study the potential impact of the business cycle itself as driving factor behind long-run
wage adjustment, we add the current unemployment rate as an additional regressor to our
baseline model. Formally, we estimate the following regression model:30
ln(yit) = ln(ur0j[i])α1 + κ (expit)α2 + [ln(ur
0
j[i]) · κ (expit)]α3 + xiβ + ψj + tiγj
+ ∆ ln(urjt)δ1 + [∆ ln(urjt) · κ(expit)]δ2 + it, (5)
30Besides the inclusion of the relative path of the current unemployment rate and the corresponding interaction
terms with labor market experience, the model specification is exactly the same as in our baseline model (see
column 3 of table 3).
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with ∆ ln(urjt) ≡ [ln(urjt − ln(ur0j )]. This variable captures the path of the current unem-
ployment rate relative to the initial unemployment rate for a given entry cohort. We include
the difference between current and initial unemployment as well as the interaction of this dif-
ference with potential labor market experience as additional regressors. As a consequence, by
conditioning on the relative path of the unemployment rate from the year of entry onwards we
simulate a hypothetical situation of persistent differences in unemployment, which is what we
are after. Also note that we do not want to condition on the current unemployment rate in
general because of the high collinearity between initial and current unemployment one the one
side, making it difficult to back out the marginal effect of the initial unemployment rate. On
the other side, the path of the unemployment rate, i.e. the path of the business cycle, may also
be regarded as part of the outcome for entering the labor market at a given initial state. Thus,
conditioning on the current unemployment rate would induce biased estimates as a result of
controlling on part of the outcome.
Figure 10
Figure 10 shows predicted wage for the different hypothetical cohorts (the corresponding
estimates are given in the last column of table 6). First, figure 10 shows that the short-run effect
is more or less unchanged (as it should be). In contrast, however, the striking feature of figure
10 is that the differences in wage profiles across the three hypothetical cohorts do not really
vanish over time, although they decrease somewhat at the highest levels of experience. The
estimated loss in lifetime earnings accumulates to about 50% in this hypothetical situation of
persistent differences in initial labor market conditions. Although this figure is highly abstract
and stylized, is still nicely illustrates the importance of cyclical fluctuations on wage differentials
across entry cohorts. Also, although this mechanism seems pretty obvious, we are not aware
that this point has been explicitly made in the relevant literature so far.
Figure 11
Finally, figure 11 shows the estimated elasticities of outcome ω with respect to the initial
unemployment rate, conditional on the path of the current unemployment rate (as before, rel-
ative to the level in the year of entry for any given cohort).31 We clearly see that the absence
31Note that figure 11 is identical to figure 7, except that the path of the current unemployment rate is used
as an additional regressor in estimating the parameters.
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of any cyclical movement at the macroeconomic level would lead to large and permanent dif-
ferences in both mobility and employment patterns. Specifically, panels (a) and (b) show that
cohorts faced with permanently higher unemployment would suffer from lower mobility, both
across firms and across industries. They would, however, also face lower risk of dropping out of
the labor force permanently, as shown in panel (c). Panels (d) and (e) show the expected effects
on the annual number of days spent in employment and unemployment, respectively. Over-
all, because unemployment increases while employment decreases permanently, there results a
strong negative effect on workers’ job tenure (see panel (f)).
5 Conclusions
We study the long-run effects of initial economic conditions on wages, using a large sample of
male workers entering the Austrian labor market sometime between 1978 and 2000. From the
population of all labor market entrants, we have chosen to study those workers who presumably
have completed secondary schooling only. Consistent with previous evidence, we find a robust
negative effect of the initial unemployment rate on starting wages. This initial negative effect
persists for the first few years after entry but then it appears to fade away afterwards. Even
though wages catch up in the longer run, the initial negative effect and the persistence of this
effect imply quite substantial effects on the present discounted value of lifetime earnings from
entering the labor market during high unemployment. Our baseline model yields an estimated
loss in the present discounted value of lifetime earnings of about 15%, comparing a hypothetical
cohort entering the labor force when unemployment is high with a cohort entering in times of
average conditions.
We also find evidence for positive sample selection over the business cycle. That is, we
find that labor market cohorts characterized by high initial unemployment are a positively
selected groups of workers. However, we also show that such compositional effects are not able
to explain away entry conditions’ effects on wages. To the contrary, taking such compositional
effects with respect to entry cohorts into account makes the short-run effect even larger and
the long-run effect quite a bit more persistent. To correctly quantify the costs of business
cycle fluctuations on labor market entrants, these compositional effects - which are mainly
channelled through delayed entry into the labor force by registering for unemployment benefits
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for example - would have to be taken into account as well.
We further show that the short-run effect of bad entry conditions is much smaller for blue-
collar than for white-collar workers and that the initial negative effect is much less persistent
for the former group, implying much smaller overall losses in lifetime earnings for blue- than for
white-collar workers. Thus blue-collar workers’ wages are much more flexible than the wages
of white-collar workers with a comparable level of education and training. This may imply
that features of internal markets such as incentive payments, for example, are more important
for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers.
Finally we find that cohorts who first enter the labor force in unfavorable economic con-
ditions differ in both their mobility and employment patterns, both of which in turn explain
part of the long-term adjustment of wages. We find that entering the labor market during
a recession has an initial negative impact on workers’ mobility, but a countervailing positive
effect on employment continuity and job tenure with the current employer. Overall, changes
in mobility, employment and tenure patterns that are induced by the initial unemployment
rate appear to cushion some of the initial negative effect on wages however. In line with pre-
vious evidence, we also find that cyclical patterns in the business cycle are the key element
behind the long-term adjustment of entry cohorts’ wages, both through their indirect effects
on mobility and tenure and through any direct effects on aggregate wages.
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Table 1: Sample selection
Age at start of first regular employment
15-30 15-21 22-30
Age at start of first job 20.760 (3.010) 19.097 (1.160) 24.386 (2.589)
Duration of first regular job 2.807 (3.983) 2.705 (4.016) 3.030 (3.900)
Blue-collar 0.650 (0.477) 0.724 (0.447) 0.487 (0.500)
White-collar 0.348 (0.476) 0.273 (0.446) 0.510 (0.500)
Nominal daily wage 34.805 (16.142) 31.774 (13.639) 41.411 (18.957)
Real daily wage 50.106 (18.747) 47.062 (15.491) 56.742 (23.027)
Below GfGr: Yes = 1 0.064 (0.244) 0.058 (0.233) 0.077 (0.266)
Above HBGr: Yes = 1 0.048 (0.213) 0.018 (0.133) 0.112 (0.315)
Region of employer:
Vienna 0.239 (0.426) 0.198 (0.399) 0.326 (0.469)
Lower Austria 0.157 (0.364) 0.170 (0.376) 0.129 (0.336)
Burgenland 0.024 (0.152) 0.025 (0.156) 0.021 (0.142)
Upper Austria 0.169 (0.375) 0.184 (0.388) 0.137 (0.344)
Styria 0.139 (0.346) 0.144 (0.351) 0.129 (0.335)
Carinthia 0.064 (0.245) 0.065 (0.247) 0.062 (0.241)
Salzburg 0.070 (0.255) 0.071 (0.257) 0.067 (0.249)
Tyrol 0.090 (0.287) 0.092 (0.289) 0.087 (0.282)
Vorarlberg 0.048 (0.214) 0.051 (0.219) 0.042 (0.201)
Industry of employer:
Agriculture 0.015 (0.121) 0.012 (0.110) 0.021 (0.142)
Electricity 0.007 (0.084) 0.009 (0.094) 0.003 (0.057)
Mining 0.006 (0.078) 0.007 (0.082) 0.005 (0.068)
Manufacturing 0.344 (0.475) 0.399 (0.490) 0.225 (0.417)
Construction 0.164 (0.371) 0.188 (0.390) 0.114 (0.318)
Wholesale and retail trade 0.149 (0.356) 0.157 (0.364) 0.130 (0.336)
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.059 (0.236) 0.045 (0.208) 0.089 (0.285)
Transportation 0.061 (0.240) 0.063 (0.243) 0.057 (0.233)
Finance 0.081 (0.273) 0.058 (0.235) 0.130 (0.337)
Cleaning, body care 0.009 (0.096) 0.008 (0.089) 0.012 (0.109)
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.010 (0.101) 0.005 (0.072) 0.021 (0.145)
Healthcare, welfare 0.014 (0.116) 0.007 (0.081) 0.029 (0.167)
Education, research 0.015 (0.121) 0.005 (0.070) 0.037 (0.189)
Lobbies, social security agencies 0.064 (0.244) 0.035 (0.185) 0.125 (0.331)
Housekeeping 0.001 (0.029) 0.000 (0.022) 0.002 (0.040)
Number of observations 1,197,704 821,028 376,676
Notes: Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Daily wages are given in Euros,
and real wage are deflated using the consumer price index with base year 2007. GfGr (“Gerinfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”) and
HBGr (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”) denotes the upper and the lower censoring point, respectively. Below GfGr is
an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is equal to or below 1.2 times the lower censoring point
and 0 otherwise. Above HBGr is an indicator taking on the value 1 if the nominal daily wage is equal to or above
0.8 times the upper censoring point and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation
Individual characteristics:
Real daily wage 47.834 15.572
Nominal daily wage 33.054 13.965
Below GfGr: Yes = 1 0.052 0.222
Above HBGr: Yes = 1 0.018 0.135
Age at start of first regular job 19.097 1.154
Age at first entry into the labor force 18.574 1.527
Duration of first regular job 2.853 4.317
Any unemployment before first job: Yes = 1 0.302 0.459
Unemployment days before first job 41.984 100.403
Blue-collar worker 0.745 0.436
White-collar worker 0.253 0.435
Aggregate-level variables:
State-level unemployment rate 6.551 2.909
District-level unemployment rate 6.609 3.166
Number of entrants, age 15-21 3, 763.821 1, 453.704
Firm-level characteristics:
Size of firm (in 100’s) 5.912 25.083
Female share of workforce 0.246 0.221
Number of quarters per year 3.941 0.340
Region of employer:
Vienna 0.179 0.383
Lower Austria 0.171 0.377
Burgenland 0.025 0.156
Upper Austria 0.195 0.396
Styria 0.146 0.353
Carinthia 0.066 0.249
Salzburg 0.071 0.256
Tyrol 0.093 0.291
Vorarlberg 0.054 0.227
Industry of employer:
Agriculture 0.011 0.102
Electricity 0.010 0.099
Mining 0.008 0.087
Manufacturing 0.419 0.493
Construction 0.200 0.400
Wholesale and retail trade 0.158 0.364
Gastronomy, hotel business 0.043 0.203
Transportation 0.040 0.195
Finance 0.059 0.236
Cleaning, body care 0.008 0.088
Arts, entertainment, sports 0.005 0.071
Healthcare, welfare 0.007 0.084
Education, research 0.005 0.071
Lobbies, social security agencies 0.028 0.164
Housekeeping 0.000 0.020
Number of observations 223,900
Notes: The two unemployment rates are computed from the raw data of the ASSD. See also
notes of table 1.
37
Table 3: The long-run effects of initial labor market shock on wages
ln(real daily wage)
Mean 4.250
Standard deviation 0.386
ln(ur0) −0.026 −0.045 −0.062?? −0.075??
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
exp 0.114??? 0.119??? 0.119??? 0.138???
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.025)
exp2 −0.008??? −0.009??? −0.009??? −0.009???
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
exp3 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
exp · ln(ur0) 0.013??? 0.015??? 0.016??? 0.020???
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
exp2 · ln(ur0) −0.001??? −0.001??? −0.001??? −0.002???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
exp3 · ln(ur0) 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
εyur(0) −0.026 −0.045 −0.062 −0.075
(0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
εyur(5) 0.009 −0.001 −0.015 −0.010
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
εyur(10) 0.005 0.002 −0.011 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
εyur(15) −0.007 −0.006 −0.019 −0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
εyur(20) 0.001 0.005 −0.009 −0.021
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific trends No Yes Yes Yes
Individual vars No No Yes Yes
Experience×entry No No No Yes
Number of observations 3, 455, 895 3, 455, 895 3, 455, 895 3, 455, 895
Number of regressors 18 34 61 64
Adjusted R-Squared 0.286 0.287 0.360 0.361
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: ???, ??, and ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors are given in parentheses and are clustered on both state and year. exp and ur0 denote potential labor
market experience (in years) and the initial unemployment rate, respectively. εyur(k) denotes the estimated
elasticity of wages with respect to the initial unemployment rate, evaluated at k years of potential labor market
experience.
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Figure 1: Long-run wage profiles, by labor market entry cohort
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(b) Wage growth over potential labor market experience
Notes: Panel (a) shows average log real daily wages, separately for each labor market entry cohort.
The black dots show average log starting wages for each labor-market entry cohort from 1978 until
2000. The black dotted line therefore highlights the evolution of starting wages over calendar time.
The colored lines show entry cohorts’ long-run wage profiles. The y-axis in panel (b) shows the
average log real daily wage minus the log real daily starting wage of the corresponding entry cohort;
panel (b) shows cohorts’ approximate wage growth since first entry versus potential labor market
experience.
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Figure 2: Fluctuations in local unemployment rates, by state
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Notes: The dashed lines show male unemployment rates at the level of the district (“Bezirk”) and
the filled dotted lines show the unemployment rate at the level of the state (“Bundesland”). Both
rates have been computed from the individual-level data of the ASSD and both refer to male workers
aged between 15 and 65. See appendix A for details.
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Figure 4: Predicted wage profiles for three hypothetical entry cohorts
3.
9
4
4.
1
4.
2
4.
3
4.
4
0 5 10 15 20
Years of experience
low ur(0) mean ur(0) high ur(0)
(a)
−
.
04
−
.
02
0
.
02
.
04
.
06
0 5 10 15 20
Years of experience
high−mean low−mean
(b)
Notes: The figure in panel (a) shows predicted wage profiles for three different, hypothetical cohorts
of labor market entrants. The dashed line shows the wage profile of a cohort entering at average
initial conditions. The dotted red (squared green) line shows the wage profile of a cohort entering
in a recession (a boom). Panel (b) shows the predicted wage profiles of the cohort entering in a
recession or a boom - relative to the cohort entering the labor market at the average unemployment
rate. See main text for details.
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Figure 5: Present discounted value of the loss (gain) in lifetime earnings
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Notes: The dotted red (squared green) line shows accumulated losses (gains) of a hypothetical cohort
entering at a high (low) initial unemployment rate, relative to a cohort entering at the average
unemployment rate. The dark-shaded lines show the present discounted value of accumulated losses
(gains) after k years of labor market experience, using a real interest rate of 8%. See main text for
details.
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Figure 6: Taking sample selection over the business cycle into account
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Notes: The figures are based on the estimates shown in column (2) of table 6. See notes of figures 4
and 5 for additional explanations.
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Figure 8: Conditioning on the evolution of mobility, employment and tenure
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Notes: The figures are based on the estimates shown in column (3) of table 6. See notes of figures 4
and 5 for additional explanations.
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Figure 10: Conditioning on the relative path of current unemployment
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Notes: The figures are based on the estimates shown in column (6) of table 6. See notes to figures 4
and 5 for additional explanations.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Sample Construction
The analysis sample has been constructed in three consecutive steps. First, we have determined
the start of the first regular employment spell for each individual born between 1958 and
1985.32 The restriction with respect to birth year, in combination with the restriction on age
at first entry that we apply below, ensures that the potential range of age at entry is the
same for each entry cohort considered in the analysis (1978-2000). Additionally, we drop all
individuals who have at least once been self-employed and/or have worked as a farmer or as
a civil servant, because such employment spells are not consistently covered by the data over
the whole period of analysis and/or because earnings are not recorded (in the case of self-
employment). We therefore can not fully observe the employment and/or earnings histories
of such individuals. Second, we have determined each individual’s age at the start of his
or her first regular employment spell starting between 1978 and 2000. We define regular
employment as an employment spell which lasts for at least 180 days. We thus consider
training (e.g. apprenticeship) not as regular employment. Considering only employment spells
with a duration of at least 180 days as regular employment gives us a total of 1,743,866
observations. Finally, as detailed in the main text, we focus on individuals aged between 15
and 21 years at the start of their first regular employment spell. This still leaves us 821,028
unique individuals (see table 1). Because we follow workers from their year of entry until the
end of the data in 2005, the resulting number of observations would have been huge. To speed
up the computations somewhat, we have taken a simple 30% random sample from all remaining
labor market entrants - without any significant loss in statistical precision. This final step gives
us a total of 223,900 unique individuals and 3,455,396 observations (= individuals × years)
when following these individuals over time.
A.2 Key Variables
The Central Social Security Administration collects the data for the administration and cal-
culation of old-age pension benefits. The ASSD thus includes very precise and comprehensive
information about annual earnings and employment histories on a daily basis as (for details,
see Zweimu¨ller et al., 2009). However, contributions to the old-age pension system are capped
from above because there is a maximum level of old-age pension benefits. Annual earnings are
therefore right-censored, i.e. earnings are recorded only up to the threshold which guarantees
the maximum benefit level (“Ho¨chstbemessungsgrundlage”, HBGr) as any wage information
on top is of no interest to the Social Security Administration. Similarly, there is also a lower
threshold below which no social security payments accrue at all (“Geringfu¨gigkeitsgrenze”,
GfGr). The two censoring points vary over time in real terms: The lower censoring point has
increased from about 14e in 1978 to about 26e in 2005, per day worked. For the same two
years, the upper censoring point has increased from about 78e and 126e per workday.
Wages
All wages are given in prices of 2007, deflated with the consumer price index (“Verbraucher-
preisindex”), and include additional/special payments like, for example, a 13th month of pay-
ment. Real daily starting wages refer to the first regular employment spell only. That is,
earnings from this first employment spell are divided by the number of days worked in this
32Obviously, to be included in the sample, an individual must be covered by the ASSD. To be covered, an
individual must be entitled to future social security benefits or must already have claimed social security benefits.
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specific job in the year of entry. Real daily wages (i.e. wages per day actually worked), on
the other hand, are computed as average earnings over all employers in a given year. That
is, we first sum total annual earnings over all employers for any individual. We then divide
overall earnings by the total number of days worked in a given year, also summed over all
employers for a given individual and taking into account overlapping employment spells. In
order to add any firm characteristics to observations from individuals who are connected with
more than a single employer within a given year, we had to decide on a primary employer for
each person-year combination. We decided to use the firm information from the employment
relationship with the longest duration in a given year. All firm characteristics in the analysis
therefore relate to the primary employer only. In most cases, there is actually no ambiguity
with respect to the primary employer anyway.
Unemployment Rates
In principle, we can compute unemployment rates at any desired level of aggregation from
the raw data from the ASSD, as the data contain comprehensive data on individuals’ daily
employment histories as well as spells of registered unemployment for the relevant population.
It is therefore straightforward, albeit somewhat time-consuming, to compute unemployment
rates at different levels of longitudinal or regional aggregation and for different age groups. We
finally decided to compute the following four unemployment rates: (i) Annual male unemploy-
ment rate for the age group 15 to 65 at the level of the state, (ii) annual male unemployment
rate for the age group 15 to 25 at the level of the state, (iii) annual male unemployment rate
for the age group 15 to 65 at the level of the district, (iv) annual male unemployment rate for
the age group 15 to 25 at the level of the district. In all four cases, annual rates are computed
as simple averages of monthly rates within any given year and for all years from 1978 until
2005.
Schooling
As mentioned in the text, there is no comprehensive schooling measure in the ASSD. For
that reason we use individuals’ age at the start of their first regular employment spell (as
defined above) as proxy for their schooling. As some individuals may claim unemployment
benefits before they start their first regular employment, we also computed individuals’ age
when starting their first spell of registered unemployment, and we then used the minimum of
these two variables as an alternative proxy for schooling (‘age at first entry’). It turns out that
there is no big difference between the two measures. We are well aware that both measures
are only imperfect proxies for educational attainment, at least for highly skilled workers. On
the other hand, however, the proxies seem to work surprisingly well in practice. For example,
the estimated returns to education in the regression models from table B.1 not only have the
expected sign, but they also all have a meaningful size troughout.
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B Results for Starting Wages
In this appendix, we show our main results for starting wages. We estimate the short-run
effects of the initial local labor market conditions on individual starting wages using regression
models of the following form:
ln(y0i ) = ln(ur
0
j[i])α+ xiβ + ψj + tiγj + i (B.1)
where y0it is the starting wage of individual i starting his first regular employment in year t,
ur0j[i]t denotes the unemployment rate prevailing in state j and year t. Vector xit contains
individual-level characteristics, e.g. age at first entry into the labor force and two dummy
variables indicating broad occupation, and firm-specific characteristics (number of employees,
the fraction of the workforce within a firm which is female, the region (“Bundesland”) and
industry of the firm). Moreover, as cohort size changes quite strongly over the period considered
in our analysis, we also include the log of the absolute number of labor market entrants aged 15
to 21 in a given year and state as regressor. Additionally we include a set of state dummies ψj
and state-specific quadratic time trends, i.e. ti includes both calendar year and its square. Of
main interest is α, which corresponds to the elasticity of the starting wage with respect to the
initial unemployment rate. Standard errors are clustered on the state×year cells throughout
to account for the group-level nature of our key regressor.
Table B.1
Our results with respect to the effect of the local unemployment rate on starting wages are
shown in table B.1. The model shown in column 1 does only include a set of state-dummies
along with state-specific quadratic time trends. The estimated elasticity of starting wages
with respect to the initial unemployment rate equals -0.074 and is very precisely estimated,
the clustering of standard errors nonetheless. We add our proxy for schooling (i.e. age at first
entry) and two occupational indicators in the second column. This makes the point estimate
more negative, yielding an elasticity of starting wages with respect to the initial unemployment
rate of -0.097. The model in column 3 adds various variables which relate to the employer, i.e.
size of the firm, the share of the workforce that is female, industry affiliation, and an indicator
for whether the firm is a seasonal firm or not. Adding these variables yields almost the same
point estimate as before (-0.100). In the fourth column, we add the log of the number of labor
market entrants as additional regressor. This model yields a point estimate of -0.129. The
fifth column uses the level of the initial unemployment rate instead of its log as key regressor,
yielding a point estimate of -0.018. We can re-express this estimate as an elasticity as to make
it comparable to the other estimates. At the sample mean, doubling the initial unemployment
rate implies an elasticity of about -0.118 (= −0018 ·6.55) and thus is very similar to the results
which use the log of the initial unemployment rate as regressor. The second to last column
adds the square of the log initial unemployment rate as additional regressor. This additional
term turns out to be small and statistically insignificant. The last column uses the level of the
initial unemployment rate and its square. Both terms are significant in this case, implying that
there is some non-linearity in the relation between wages and unemployment. This leads us to
think that using the log of the initial unemployment rate is an appropriate and parsimonious
model specification.
How do our results compare to published estimates of the elasticity of wages with respect
to labor market conditions? Winter-Ebmer (1996) reports elasticities ranging from -0.02 to
-0.07 whereas Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) report a range of elasticities of about -0.12 to
-0.16. The average estimate for Austria reported in Nijkamp et al. (2005) equals -0.068. In
comparison, our estimates are thus much larger than previous estimates for Austria.
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However note that our study focuses on new labor market entrants only, whereas studies
on the wage-curve in general estimate the wage elasticity of all workers. This may rationalize
that we find effects that are quite a bit larger than the average estimate for Austria reported
by Nijkamp et al. (2005) because we think that starting wages are more elastic than incumbent
workers’ wages.
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C Sample Selection Over the Business Cycle
In this appendix, we provide some additional evidence with respect to sample selection over
the business cycle.
C.1 Delayed Entry into the Labor Force
We first look at the association between the aggregate number of labor market entrants and
the unemployment rate. The estimated elasticity of the number of entrants with respect to
the unemployment rate tells us something about the immediate impact of the business cycle
on employment. However, note that the reported effect is a mixture of a permanent effect on
non-participation, an effect of prolonged duration of schooling and an effect on delayed entry
into the labor force. We regress regress the log of the number of labor market entrants on the
contemporaneous unemployment rate:
ln(ejt) = ln(urjt)α+ ln(cst)β + ψj + tjγ + jt, (C.1)
where ejt and urjt correspond, respectively, to the absolute number of labor market entrants
aged 15 to 21 when first entering into the labor force and the unemployment rate in state j
and year t. We also include the underlying cohort size cst, which presumably is one of the
key determinants of the number of actual labor market entrants.33 We further include a set of
state dummies, denoted by ψj , and a quadratic time trend, denoted by tj . We are interested in
the elasticity of the number of labor market entrants with respect to the unemployment rate,
which is given by parameter α. Results are given in table C.1.
Table C.1
The first column of table C.1 shows that the raw elasticity of the number of entrants aged
15 to 21 and the current unemployment rate is -0.086. Adding cohort size does not change the
point estimate by much, as shown by the second column. The third column adds state dummies
and a quadratic time trend as regressors. This yields a estimated elasticity of -0.132, quite a
bit larger than the first two estimates. Also, note that log cohort size has the expected positive
sign now (as opposed to the model in column 2). Using the level of initial unemployment yields
very similar results in terms of elasticity, and functional form is thus not important. The right
panel of table C.1 shows analogous estimates using the log number of entrants aged between 22
and 30 as dependent variable. Looking at the model in the third column, which again includes
the log unemployment rate, the log cohort size as well as state dummies and a quadratic time
trends yields a point estimate of -0.287. As expected, the elasticity of more skilled workers
appear more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations therefore.
Next, we look at the effect of the local unemployment rate on the timing of first entry into
the labor force. Because some workers are eligible for unemployment benefits before their first
regular employment (e.g. after completion of an apprenticeship training), we can estimate the
effect of the initial unemployment rate on the probability of experiencing any unemployment
before one’s first regular employment spell. Such estimates are informative about delayed entry
33Because we only observe individuals’ actual labor market entry, the potential number of labor market
entrants is unknown to us. We therefore approximate this number by the size of the underlying birth cohorts.
First, we extract the number of individuals covered by the ASSD for each year of birth. These numbers do not
exactly correspond to the actual size of birth cohorts because individuals who will never enter the labor market
will not show up at all in the data. However, a comparison between our figures and official numbers shows that
we come pretty close to actual cohort size. We then compute the number of potential entrants aged 15 to 21 as
a simple weighted average of the corresponding birth cohorts for 1978 until 1997.
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and therefore about endogenous timing of labor market entry. To this end, we estimate models
of the following form:
ue0i = ln(ur
0
j[i])α+ xiβ + ψj[i] + tiγj + i, (C.2)
where ue0i is a measure for an individual’s unemployment experience before his first regular
employment spell, which is either a dummy variable indicating any unemployment or a variable
counting the number of unemployment days before the start of one’s first regular employment
spell. The regressor of key interest is ur0j[i], the unemployment rate prevailing in the year of
entry in state j. We include additional control variables (xit) that are plausibly exogenous
at the time of first entry, including broad occupation and age at first entry as our proxy for
schooling.34 As before, we also include the log number of labor market entrants to control
for demographic shifts that may trigger corresponding changes in the unemployment rate.
We further include a set of state dummies and allow for state-specific quadratic time trends,
denoted by ψj and tiγj , respectively. In all regressions shown, standard errors are adjusted for
clustering at the state×year level.
Table C.2
Results are shown in the left panel (first four columns) of table C.2. The dependent
variable in the first two columns is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual has ex-
perienced any unemployment before entering the labor market and corresponds to the number
of days spent in registered unemployment before entering the labor market in the following
two columns. As regards the individual probability of experiencing an unemployment spell
before regular employment, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of the local
unemployment rate at the year of entry. The point estimate of the model with full controls is
0.1, which corresponds to an elasticity of about a third if evaluated at the mean value of the
dependent variable (= 0.1/0.302). Similarly, there is a positive effect of the initial unemploy-
ment rate on the number of days spent in registered unemployment, as shown by columns 3
and 4 of table C.2. Again, the model with full controls implies a large elasticity of unemploy-
ment duration before first regular employment with respect to the initial unemployment rate.
Indeed, evaluated at the mean value of the dependent variable, the elasticity if almost 50%
(= 20.888/41.984 · 100%).
C.2 Schooling Over the Business Cycle
A more direct test for selection, and one that actually yields information about the sign of
selection, looks at average schooling of new entrants over the business cycle. Therefore, the
right panel (the last four columns) of table C.2 provide results for regression models with our
proxies for schooling as the dependent variable:
age0i = ln(ur
0
j[i])α+ x
0
iβ + ψj[i] + tiγ + i, (C.3)
where age0i is either an individual’s age at the start of his or her first regular job or else the
age when first entering the labor market, defined as the minimum of age at the start of first
regular job and age at the start of first unemployment spell. The variables on the right-hand
side are exactly the same as in equation (C.2) before, except that schooling does not show up
34One might challenge the assumption that occupation and industry of first regular employment are exogenous
in equation (C.2). However, as most of the workers in our sample presumably have completed an apprenticeship,
it seems reasonable to treat both broad occupation and industry as exogenous.
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as regressor. Parameter α signifies whether there is positive or negative selection as a result of
a high local unemployment rate. Results are given in right panel of table C.2.
Table C.2
It turns out that, whichever of the two dependent variables is used and independent of the
exact model specification, the estimated marginal effect of the local unemployment rate with
respect to schooling is always significantly positive, showing that the sample of entrants is
positively selected in times of high unemployment. Because we expect a negative effect of the
initial unemployment rate on wages, the effect of selection runs counter and therefore we should
get a downward biased (i.e. a lower bound on the) effect of unemployment using the selected
sample only. At the same time, note that the estimated effect of the initial unemployment
rate on schooling is quite small throughout: it lies somewhere between about 0.018 and 0.028
(again, evaluated at sample means).
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